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In his insightful new book, Managed Speech: The Roberts Court’s First 
Amendment (2017), Professor Greg Magarian criticizes the Roberts Court 
for adopting a “managed speech” approach in its First Amendment cases. 
According to Professor Magarian, that approach gives too much power to 
private and governmental actors to manage public discourse, constrain 
dissident speakers, and instill social and political stability. This Article 
argues that at least insofar as it relates to many forms of public dissent, the 
managed speech approach is both deeply rooted in First Amendment 
jurisprudence and culturally prevalent. Historically, First Amendment 
jurisprudence has expressed support for narrowly managed public dissent. 
Expressive activities that pose no threat of actual disruption, and that do 
not risk undermining social and political stability, have been granted a 
preferred position. Managed speech attitudes and principles are part of our 
contemporary culture and politics. Public and private actors manage 
dissent from statehouses, to college campuses, to National Football League 
stadiums. Legislatures and executive officials have sought to curb public 
protests, universities have acted to limit campus dissent, and the NFL has 
faced pressure to dismiss players who refuse to stand at attention during the 
playing of the national anthem. In these contexts, officials and private 
institutions have sought to curb, tame, and marginalize public dissent. 
Efforts to manage dissent cut sharply against the alternative “dynamic 
diversity” model that Professor Magarian advocates in his book. Achieving 
that ideal will take more than a few Supreme Court decisions. It will require 
changing political and cultural attitudes concerning the meaning and value 
of public dissent.  
INTRODUCTION 
In his recently published book, Managed Speech: The Roberts Court’s 
First Amendment,1 Professor Greg Magarian criticizes the Roberts Court 
for adopting what he calls a “managed speech” approach that “seeks to 
reconcile substantial First Amendment protection for expressive freedom 
with aggressive preservation of social and political stability.”2 Thus, in 
“government preserves” such as public streets and parks, the Roberts Court 
has generally upheld the authority of property owners to manage expressive 
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activities.3 The same holds largely true, Professor Magarian argues, with 
regard to public universities.4 Private speech has been protected—one 
might alternatively say tolerated—mostly insofar as it has not been 
disruptive of social order or the political status quo. Professor Magarian 
concludes: “The Roberts Court, with a consistency and potency unique in 
the Supreme Court’s history, has authorized established, powerful 
institutions . . . to exercise managerial control over public discussion, with 
the apparent goal and typical result of pushing public discussion away from 
destabilizing, noisy margins and toward a stable, settled center.”5  
In fact, “managed speech,” as Professor Magarian defines it, has long 
been a staple of First Amendment jurisprudence concerning public dissent. 
Although on a few occasions Professor Magarian refers to the Burger and 
Warren Courts, his analysis does not, for perfectly understandable reasons, 
generally cut across Courts. If it had, the study would have found that 
although the Supreme Court has at times extolled the virtues of dissent and 
disruption, it has generally supported public contention only insofar as the 
means are peaceful and non-disruptive. As Professor Magarian charges, the 
Roberts Court has generally empowered institutions to curb private dissent 
and manage government preserves in ways that maintain a certain kind of 
social and political stability. Although some of its decisions may have 
exacerbated this situation, the Roberts Court was not working on a blank 
slate. In most cases, it was applying deeply ingrained managerial speech 
attitudes, principles, and doctrines.  
Although we are a nation both literally and figuratively built on public 
dissent, restrictions on acts of dissent—public assembly, protest, and 
demonstrations—have been commonplace since at least the nineteenth 
century.6 The prevailing attitude is written into the First Amendment’s 
Assembly Clause, which protects not the right to assemble but the right to 
“peaceably” do so.7 Of course, dissenters have no First Amendment right 
                                                 
3. See TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN 
PUBLIC PLACES (2009). 
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to engage in violent or criminal acts, but today’s “peaceable” assemblies 
and protests are managed far beyond these obvious limitations. To be sure, 
political dissenters and a virtual rogue’s gallery of speakers have won 
notable and celebrated victories at the Supreme Court. However, as 
discussed below, many of those victories occurred precisely because the 
speaker did not disrupt social expectations or challenge the political status 
quo. Again, the Roberts Court has followed this pattern by continuing the 
Court’s long tradition of upholding measures that curb and tame public 
dissent.  
What is more disturbing, there is mounting evidence that Americans 
have largely internalized and accepted the strict management of dissent by 
public and private actors. Consider the recent spate of proposals put forward 
by many state legislatures that would crack down on public dissent and 
protest. Starting in early 2017, and in response to high-profile public 
protests, state legislatures across the nation proposed or enacted a bevy of 
measures designed to manage public dissent by making it more difficult, 
expensive, or even dangerous. As discussed in Part II, some of the proposals 
would increase penalties for obstructing traffic or engaging in other kinds 
of disruptive behavior. Others would apply rioting and racketeering laws to 
protest organizers. Some would authorize the seizure of assets belonging to 
protesters, in the event that a protest became violent. Further, some states 
have proposed measures that would make it easier for law enforcement to 
simply shut down events such as mass protests. Others, in response to 
heckling incidents, have moved to impose stiffer penalties for threatening, 
intimidating, or harassing public officials. Finally, a few states have 
considered holding harmless any driver who inadvertently strikes a 
protester who is blocking a roadway.8  
Executive officials have not been immune to this anti-dissent fervor. A 
woman who laughed (involuntarily, she says) at the confirmation hearing 
of Jeff Sessions to be Attorney General of the United States was tried and 
convicted for disorderly conduct and “demonstrating” on the Capitol 
grounds.9 For this audacious act of public dissent, she faced a hefty fine and 
up to a year in prison. Prosecutors finally dropped the case, but only after 
winning a jury verdict that was tossed out and announcing that they would 
retry the case.10 On a broader scale, the Justice Department has aggressively 
pursued more than 200 individuals who allegedly participated in inaugural 
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day protests. In that case, it sought digital records relating to participation 
in public protests and charged the group of protesters with felony 
conspiracy to engage in a riot.11  
Unfortunately, these are not the only examples that suggest a strong 
backlash against public forms of dissent. As discussed below, at many 
colleges and universities, administrators have cracked down on offensive 
and disruptive expression by students, faculty, and outsiders. They have 
adopted and enforced detailed codes that model the regulatory regime 
applicable outside campus to places within campus gates.12 Some 
universities have disinvited or refused to host controversial outside 
speakers.13 Some students have likewise embraced managed speech. For 
example, students have physically interfered with access by outside 
speakers or reacted violently to their presence. Others have interrupted 
invited speakers whose messages they consider too controversial or hurtful. 
Students have also used their own free speech rights to shout down 
speakers. All of this activity has resulted in the effective silencing of 
speech, in the name of keeping students safe from certain controversial 
messages or speakers. In response, lawmakers and administrators are 
beginning to respond with a cure that may be as bad as or worse than the 
disease. For instance, the University of Wisconsin recently adopted student 
conduct rules that would result in the suspension and possible expulsion of 
students who engage in what is arguably a form of counter-speech.14 This 
sort of administrative response could further suppress the vigorous 
exchange of ideas on university campuses.  
Managed speech has also been manifested more broadly, in notable 
social and political conflicts. The recent controversy concerning NFL 
players’ racial justice protests during pre-game ceremonies, in particular 
during the singing of the national anthem, are one example. Official 
pressure has been brought to bear on these dissenters. President Trump has 
opined that players should stand at attention during the national anthem and 
flag ceremonies, or be disciplined by team owners and managers for failing 
to do so.15 A state legislator recently introduced a bill that would entitle fans 
to a refund in the event they had to witness such an offensive form of 
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12. See generally ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS, supra note 3, ch.8 (discussing spatial and other 
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13. See GREG LUKIANOFF, FREEDOM FROM SPEECH 29–36 (2014) (discussing “disinvitation 
season” on university campuses). 
14. Todd Richmond, University of Wisconsin Approves Policy That Punishes Student Protesters, 
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dissent.16 Some fans have also sued for refunds, alleging that the anthem 
dissents nullify their season ticket purchases.17 The First Amendment may 
not be formally implicated in this controversy, since (thus far, at least) no 
government official has taken any direct action against the players or 
coerced management to discipline or fire them. However, the fact that a 
silent, peaceful protest has generated such public controversy—even 
outrage in some quarters—is telling. Apparently, many Americans view the 
peaceful expression of dissent on a matter of critical public concern as an 
act of disrespect to the nation.  
Managed dissent is rooted in our First Amendment history and 
jurisprudence. It is manifested in recent proposals for further narrowing or 
punishing the exercise of public dissent. It is evident on many of our public 
and private campuses. And it is threatening to drive out public professions 
of dissent by casting them as disrespectful, disruptive, and even unpatriotic.  
Professor Magarian proposes a different approach, which he calls 
“dynamic diversity.”18 Dynamic diversity seeks to facilitate the 
communication of diverse ideas and participation by diverse speakers. It 
pushes back against the managerial power that the Court has permitted 
officials, administrators, and private institutions to exercise. However, to 
change this situation, to rise above and perhaps escape managed speech, 
will take more than a few decisions by the current or future Supreme Court. 
As my examples show, to achieve something like dynamic diversity in our 
free expression culture will require more than a change in judicial attitude 
or doctrine. It will require a concerted effort by a diversity of managers—
lawmakers, college administrators, and private employers—to facilitate 
those goals. More broadly, achieving the goals of dynamic diversity will 
require broad-scale attitudinal changes among our citizens regarding the 
purposes and values of public protest and dissent.19  
Part I of the Article discusses Professor Magarian’s conception of 
“managed speech.” It argues that the management of public protest and 
dissent is deeply rooted in First Amendment precedents, concepts, and 
principles. Our First Amendment jurisprudence has structured public 
protest by favoring non-disruptive speakers, delegating control of public 
properties to public managers, and limiting contacts with “outsiders.” The 
Roberts Court’s First Amendment decisions have followed this 
jurisprudential tradition by generally supporting public speech rights only 
insofar as they do not pose any serious threats to public order and stability.  
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Part II looks outside and beyond the Supreme Court to current examples 
of managed dissent within the body politic. It focuses on the three contexts 
mentioned earlier—public demonstrations, campus dissent, and 
professional athlete protests. In each of these contexts, there has been a 
significant backlash against public protest and dissent. Public and private 
actors have moved to curb or quash public contention. Working from 
something similar to the template of managed speech, they have proposed 
or enforced limits on public rallies, restrictions on campus dissent, and 
public displays of protest. In these and other quarters, dissent is not viewed 
as a patriotic exercise or civic duty. Instead, it is increasingly perceived as 
a threat to public unity and an act of disrespect.  
Part III assesses the prospects for resisting the management of dissent 
and adopting something like the “dynamic diversity” approach supported 
by Professor Magarian. The Supreme Court can and should play a role in 
encouraging a diversity of ideas and a diversity of participants. However, 
as my examples will show, whether dynamic diversity stands a fighting 
chance will depend more on the managers, political leaders, and public 
audiences that can create the conditions for its adoption. If free speech is to 
be “an engine of political and social change,” as Professor Magarian 
advocates, we will need more than a Supreme Court dedicated to this goal.20 
We will need to draw on another First Amendment tradition: a commitment 
to public protest and dissent not just as civil liberties but as civic duties.21  
I. “MANAGED SPEECH” 
A. Dissent and Public Protest in the Roberts Court Era 
As Professor Magarian observes, judged by the results of many of its 
First Amendment decisions, the Roberts Court might be characterized as a 
champion of freedom of expression. In a number of cases, the Court has 
ruled in favor of First Amendment claimants. In the process, it has extended 
protection to some unsavory and offensive speakers.  
In his study of Roberts Court First Amendment decisions, Professor 
Magarian takes a more critical view of the Court’s free expression 
jurisprudence. He argues that the Roberts Court has generally adopted a 
“managed speech” approach to First Amendment issues. By this he means 
that the Court has generally authorized public and private actors “to 
exercise a strong measure of managerial control over public discussions.”22 
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Professor Magarian claims that the Court has “disregarded the expressive 
interests and First Amendment claims of outsider speakers” and shown “a 
consistent preference for modes of public discussion that promote social 
and political stability, while disfavoring modes of public discussion that 
threaten to destabilize existing arrangements of social and political 
power.”23 
I do not agree with the manner in which Professor Magarian 
characterizes all of the Roberts Court’s free expression decisions. However, 
particularly with regard to decisions concerning dissent and public protest, 
I agree with his thesis that the Roberts Court has embraced a “managed 
speech” approach. The Roberts Court has not been a strong champion of 
contentious displays, disruptive modes of speech, or potentially 
destabilizing demonstrations of political dissent. Even in decisions 
upholding free speech and other expressive claims, the Court has 
demonstrated a preference for methods of protest and dissent that do not 
threaten the social and political status quo.  
Thus, as Professor Magarian shows, in public fora and other 
“government preserves” the Roberts Court has authorized public officials, 
within broad parameters, to manage and control expression.24 As property 
owners, officials exercise broad discretion to control the when, where, and 
how of public discourse. To take an example from the Roberts Court era, 
in McCullen v. Coakley, the Court reviewed a Massachusetts law that 
narrowly constrained “sidewalk counseling” near abortion clinics.25 
Although it ultimately invalidated the law, the Court refused to treat it as 
aimed at suppressing dissent near abortion clinics (although it only applied 
near such facilities and exempted clinic employees from its restrictions).26  
As Professor Magarian notes, although the speakers won the case, 
McCullen only appears to reflect support for contentious speech in the 
public forum. As the Court emphasized, the “sidewalk counselors” were 
not actually engaged in “protest” at all.27 According to the Court, they 
sought only to engage in a peaceful, orderly, and reserved conversation with 
their intended audience—women seeking access to health care facilities.28 
McCullen is thus not a “protest” case. It does not signal any retreat from the 
recognition of managerial authority with regard to protests in public fora. It 
does not address, much less bid to challenge, the authority to maintain 
social stability on the public streets and sidewalks. Rather, McCullen 
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recognizes a relatively narrow right to engage in a quiet and orderly form 
of face-to-face conversation on public sidewalks. So long as this kind of 
speech does not disrupt, interrupt, or otherwise threaten public order, 
government power to restrict or ban the speech is limited.  
As Professor Magarian claims, governments have other means of 
managing speech in the “preserves” they own and operate. For example, 
they frequently condition the receipt of government funds or benefits on 
forms of expression the government-as-subsidizer favors. Thus, in 
Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the Roberts Court held that a public 
law school could condition its official recognition of student groups on their 
obligation to accept “all comers.”29 This meant that the Christian Legal 
Society (CLS) could not reject potential members—even if they did not 
ascribe to the group’s specified commitments regarding sexual activity and 
homosexual conduct in particular. Under this rule, the campus Democrats 
could not turn away committed Republicans who wanted to join their group. 
Notably, the Roberts Court decided the case under the rubric of the “public 
forum,” holding that the law school’s student recognition program was a 
form of subsidy—a “limited public forum”—as to which it could apply any 
reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restrictions.30 Martinez concluded that 
CLS’s dissenting view with regard to matters of sexuality, as well as its 
claim of associational freedom, had to yield to the law school’s preferred 
position that “all comers” be eligible for group membership. 
McCullen and Martinez are examples of how Roberts Court decisions 
have empowered governmental owners and funders to control expression 
through the powers of management and subsidy. These decisions allow 
government officials to shape public discourse by controlling rights to 
speak and associate in government preserves. 
As Professor Magarian shows, Roberts Court decisions with respect to 
private speech—speech that exists separate and apart from any 
governmental support for it—have also recognized the broad authorities of 
public and private managers. In Snyder v. Phelps, the Court invalidated a 
sizeable civil verdict, based on an intentional infliction of emotional 
distress claim, against a group that protested near a funeral for a military 
veteran.31 The group, the Westboro Baptist Church, infamously used the 
occasion of military funerals to protest the U.S. military, policies relating 
to LGBT rights, and the Catholic Church.32 They chanted and held up signs 
saying things like “God Hates Fags” and “Thank God for IEDs.”33  
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On its face, Snyder seems like a decision that embraces a deeply 
offensive and disruptive form of political protest. However, as it did in 
McCullen, the Court took pains to note that the protesters were in a place 
they had a right to be and were otherwise in compliance with all local laws 
concerning time, place, and manner regulations.34 As the Court observed, 
the protesters “did not yell or use profanity, and there was no violence 
associated with the picketing.”35 As the Court also noted, the plaintiff did 
not actually see or hear the protesters on the day of the funeral.36  
Snyder seems like a significant victory for public protesters. However, 
although Snyder prohibits government from imposing civil liability for 
“outrageous” political dissent, it does not prevent government from 
enacting laws that effectively displace protesters—even, perhaps, to the 
extent that they cannot be seen or heard. Indeed, both before and after 
Snyder, states, localities, and the federal government have imposed strict 
limits on funeral protests.37 As Professor Magarian correctly observes, 
Snyder does not affect those efforts. Indeed, by mentioning the alternative 
of zoning out the speech of funeral protesters, the decision tacitly approves 
of them.  
The Roberts Court also held that the federal government can restrict 
private political speech that crosses international borders. In Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the Court upheld a federal law that 
prohibits any person from providing “material support” to designated 
“foreign terrorist organizations.”38 A group of Americans filed a pre-
enforcement challenge to the law. They wanted to assist designated foreign 
terrorist organizations with lawful educational and legal activities. 
Specifically, they wanted to help the organizations file petitions at the 
United Nations and provide them with instruction concerning principles of 
international law.39  
The Roberts Court held that the law was valid as applied to these 
activities and any other form of expression that is “coordinated with, or 
controlled by foreign terrorist groups.”40 It concluded that the government 
had compelling national security and foreign relations interests, and that the 
law furthered those interests by narrowly proscribing forms of 
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“coordinated” expression and association that might indirectly facilitate the 
violent ends of the foreign terrorist organizations.41  
Consider, finally, a decision that was handed down after Professor 
Magarian’s book was published, but which also fits the managerial model. 
In Packingham v. North Carolina, the Roberts Court unanimously 
invalidated a state law that effectively barred released sex offenders from 
visiting a wide variety of internet websites, including the most popular 
social network sites.42 The decision contains soaring dicta about the 
importance of cyber speech and cyber places.43 However, the Court’s actual 
holding does nothing to challenge or upset the broad public and private 
regulatory authority that service providers and others exercise over cyber 
speech. As it had in in Snyder, the Packingham Court emphasized that a 
narrower law targeting certain online activities would likely survive First 
Amendment scrutiny.44 More generally, the Court did not question the 
underlying public-private distinction that permits private owners to restrict 
speech in ways that would otherwise violate the First Amendment. In other 
words, for all its lofty dicta, Packingham does not announce a public forum 
doctrine for cyber places. The decision accepts and applies the existing 
managerial framework for speech in those places. 
In sum, with regard to both expression in “government preserves” and 
private expression, the Roberts Court has applied a managerial approach 
that allows officials and private actors to continue to exercise significant 
control over public protest and private expression. It has recognized this 
authority with respect to public sidewalks, public campuses, international 
borders, and cyberspaces. First Amendment decisions like McCullen, 
Snyder, and Packingham, which on the surface appear to embrace broad 
First Amendment rights, actually do relatively little to protect public or 
private expression. As Professor Magarian observes, these and other 
decisions grant public and private authorities broad power to manage 
speech in a variety of contexts and fora.  
B. Our Managed Speech Tradition 
As noted, the “managed speech” approach Professor Magarian identifies 
did not spring forth anew from the Roberts Court. As Professor Magarian 
observes, on at least a few occasions, in many instances the Roberts Court 
was applying longstanding First Amendment managerial attitudes, 
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principles, and doctrines. With respect to dissent and public protest in 
particular, the Roberts Court thus far has mostly ratified and applied a 
managed speech tradition that is deeply rooted in First Amendment 
jurisprudence. Thus, while its decisions may have exacerbated some of the 
problems associated with the managerial model, the Roberts Court was 
hardly working from a blank slate. 
1. Robust, Uninhibited, Wide Open: Provoking, Inducing Unrest, and 
Stirring to Anger 
The lore of our First Amendment, in particular the Free Speech Clause, 
is that it protects vocal, offensive, and disruptive forms of public dissent. 
Americans boast that the right to offend and disturb is part of the freedom 
the First Amendment protects, indeed part of an exceptional American 
speech culture.  
This attitude has sometimes been reflected in Supreme Court decisions. 
In Terminiello v. City of Chicago, for example, the Court wrote that speech 
“may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs 
people to anger.”45 The Court went on to note that “[s]peech is often 
provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions 
and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an 
idea.”46 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which altered the nation’s libel 
laws to create breathing space for criticism of government officials, the 
Supreme Court wrote that debate on public matters should be “uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open.”47  
However, insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, a far more 
conservative attitude with regard to public expression has typically 
prevailed. Dissent that induces unrest, stirs to anger, or creates 
dissatisfaction with the status quo has not received the favored or celebrated 
status suggested by the rhetoric in cases like Terminiello and Sullivan. 
Indeed, First Amendment jurisprudence has long preferred “safer” forms of 
dissent. Thus, despite the obvious importance of protecting dissent in times 
of war and conflict, the Supreme Court’s World War I-era free speech cases 
consistently upheld lengthy prison terms for speakers who distributed 
political pamphlets or made political speeches. Justice Holmes’s now-
famous dissents, which objected to the application of the “clear and 
[present] danger” standard, did so in part because the speakers were “puny 
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anonymities” who conveyed “silly” ideas.48 Holmes’s characterizations 
suggested that the speech and speakers most worthy of First Amendment 
coverage and protection were those that posed the least threat to social 
stability and political order. 
Of course, as scholars have noted, officials have tended to give less 
protection to freedom of speech and other expressive rights during times of 
war.49 However, even in its earliest cases upholding public speech rights, 
the Hughes Court was willing to protect public dissent only if it was 
carefully managed, didn’t stir anyone to anger, and did not threaten any 
serious disruption. For instance, the Court overturned a breach of peace 
conviction against a Jehovah’s Witness in part because he was “upon a 
public street, where he had a right to be, and where he had a right peacefully 
to impart his views to others.”50 There was no evidence, observed the Court, 
that the speaker’s “deportment was noisy, truculent, overbearing or 
offensive.”51 He demonstrated no “intentional discourtesy.”52 The Witness 
did not intend to “insult or affront” his public audience.53 In another early 
case, the Court observed that epithets and swear words (also known as 
“fighting words”) directed at a person “without a disarming smile” were 
not entitled to coverage under the Free Speech Clause.54 In that case, the 
speaker, another Jehovah’s Witness, had the audacity to call a public 
official a “damn Fascist” and “a God damned racketeer.”55  
To be sure, some of these early decisions were critically important 
victories for public speech and assembly rights. They established, for 
example, that speakers had a right to use the public sidewalks and streets to 
communicate with public audiences. However, they also clearly and 
consistently indicated that public forms of dissent and protest were more 
likely to receive coverage and protection under the Free Speech Clause 
insofar as they did not pose any serious challenge to social order, cause any 
actual disruption, or threaten the status quo. Thus, a speaker who peacefully 
and non-truculently communicated on the streets was assured of some First 
Amendment protection (if not protection from angry mobs). But a speaker 
who communicated with the intent to offend a public audience, without a 
“disarming smile,” or with the wrong bearing, was not so assured.  
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Later, the Court sanctioned measures designed to protect speakers from 
hostile crowds who might be offended by their speech or moved to violence 
because of it. In Feiner v. New York,56 the Court upheld the disorderly 
conduct conviction of a speaker who called political figures, including 
President Truman, “bums” and suggested that African-Americans should 
“rise up” and fight for their equality rights.57 Feiner was arrested owing to 
the reaction of onlookers, some of whom were offended or agitated by his 
speech. His remarks had apparently “stirred up a little excitement.”58 One 
of the onlookers told police officers on the scene: “If you don’t get that son 
of a bitch off, I will go over and get him off there myself.”59 Instead of 
arresting the onlooker, the police arrested Feiner—for his refusal to stop 
speaking when ordered to do so. The Court upheld the conviction, citing 
the city’s overriding interest in “peace and order on its streets.”60 
This pattern, again particularly with regard to public protest and dissent, 
generally held even during what many view as the heyday of freedom of 
expression—during the Warren Court and civil rights eras. To be sure, civil 
rights protesters won important First Amendment victories relating to 
public dissent. But the movement itself was committed to peaceful methods 
of protest; the violence and disruption typically came from officials and 
private parties opposed to the movement. Although in some post-Feiner 
civil rights cases the Court invalidated breach of peace convictions on what 
seemed like very similar facts, it again emphasized that those assembled 
were engaged in passive demonstrations and peaceful marches.61 Although 
these were significant victories for the protesters and more generally for the 
civil rights movement, note that they rested on the notion that public dissent 
and protest was worthy of protection so long as it did not pose any actual 
risk to public order.  
Other cases from the civil rights era adopted a similar perspective 
concerning the scope of public dissent. The Court upheld the free speech 
right to engage in a silent civil rights protest in a public library reading 
room.62 It held that public elementary and junior high school students could 
wear black armbands in silent protest of the Vietnam War—that is, so long 
as their speech did not “materially disrupt or invade the rights of others.”63 
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But when civil rights protesters got too close for comfort to government 
buildings such as schools and jailhouses, the Court did not hesitate to 
uphold their breach of peace and disorderly conduct convictions.64 And the 
Court saw no merit in First Amendment challenges to segregation in public 
accommodations like lunch counters.65  
I do not mean to suggest that the Warren Court and Burger Court failed 
to recognize, and even expand upon, First Amendment rights to 
communicate public dissent and to criticize government. After all, the 
Court refashioned tort law to permit speakers to engage in robust and 
sometimes caustic criticism of government.66 The Court also articulated 
strong defenses of what might be considered offensive forms of dissent. In 
Cohen v. California, the Court overturned the conviction of a man who 
wore a jacket emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft” into the corridor 
of a public courthouse—in part, though, because no one in the corridor was 
apparently stirred to anger or even much disturbed by the jacket.67  
However, despite the liberalization of public speech and dissent rights, 
First Amendment precedents have not eagerly embraced speech that 
“created conditions of unrest” or “stirred people to anger.”68 Indeed, our 
free speech narrative of “uninhibited and wide-open discourse” has actually 
been more myth than reality—an aspirational story we tell ourselves about 
robust expressive rights. In fact, the First Amendment has mostly protected 
speakers who towed a certain line in terms of accepted social and political 
behavior. Silent protests and expressive activities that did not upset 
sensibilities have generally been treated as protected speech—but not 
burning a draft card as part of an otherwise peaceful public protest, 
protesting near a jail where political prisoners were being held, uttering 
“dirty words” on the radio as part of a political commentary about language 
repression, or sleeping overnight in a park near the U.S. capitol.69 These 
forms of expression were all considered too “robust,” “uninhibited,” or 
“wide-open” to merit full First Amendment protection.  
Even Brandenburg v. Ohio,70 which narrowed the standard for 
“incitement” and created breathing space for political dissent, involved the 
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sort of “anonymities” Justice Holmes was referring to in his early dissent. 
A group of KKK members one could only describe as clownishly non-
threatening had burned some crosses in a rural Ohio field.71 They talked of 
taking “revengeance” against the government and marching on 
Washington, D.C. and perhaps other places.72 Like other public speakers 
who prevailed in First Amendment challenges, this group was an orderly, 
non-disruptive, and decidedly non-threatening group. 
2. The Public Order Management System 
The roots of our managed speech tradition go much deeper than this 
preference for non-threatening and non-disruptive speakers. First 
Amendment doctrines relating to speech on public properties and regulation 
of the time, place, and manner of expression have long reflected this 
attitude. In general, these doctrines have imposed a public order 
management system on dissent and protest. They have made it more 
difficult, and more costly, to engage in public protests and demonstrations.  
Public properties and other “government preserves” (as Professor 
Magarian refers to them) are managed under a regime that combines official 
control over access to public places with power to enforce content-neutral 
limits on the “time, place, and manner” of expression in those places.73 As 
I have explained at length elsewhere, this “public order management 
system,” which has been in place since the 1970s, has significantly 
narrowed the scope and contours of our “expressive topography”—the 
places where expressive activity is allowed to occur—and restricted the 
ability of speakers to reach intended audiences.74 Those wishing to engage 
in disruptive forms of public protest must now run a daunting gauntlet of 
permit requirements, free speech zones and other physical barricades, 
aggressive law enforcement tactics, and public order laws.  
Although some of these measures have been successfully challenged, 
courts generally defer to governmental managers’ interests in order, safety, 
and even aesthetics.75 Under the managerial regime, public contention that 
disturbs the peace, interferes with residential or personal tranquility, or 
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proffers speech to unwilling audiences may be restricted or suppressed.76 
This is the regime that governs cases like McCullen which, as noted, upheld 
the sidewalk counselor’s free speech claim but left undisturbed the core of 
the managerial framework.  
Constitutional doctrine has been even less protective of dissent and 
protest in non-governmental preserves. In this context, the managerial 
approach is deeply rooted in principles of state action and private property 
rights. Marsh v. Alabama held that a Jehovah’s Witness distributing leaflets 
on the streets of a “company town” could raise a First Amendment defense 
to his arrest.77 However, Marsh is an outlier insofar as private properties 
are concerned. For example, the Court has held that privately owned and 
operated shopping malls are not part of the First Amendment’s expressive 
topography. Even though these places often operate as the functional 
equivalent of public streets and plazas, speakers have no access to them for 
purposes of the First Amendment.78 The spaces that are meaningfully open 
for purposes of public dissent and protest are generally limited to the public 
streets, parks, and most sidewalks.  
Despite its dicta concerning the Internet-as-public forum, cases like 
Packingham are governed by this aspect of the managed speech framework. 
Access to Facebook and Twitter are determined by the private owners and 
managers of those spaces, as dictated by their terms and conditions. Dissent 
and protest are obviously allowed in cyberplaces, and at least in some 
quarters this expression is wide open and robust. But as of this moment, 
this is a function of the grace of private intermediaries, who are not required 
to comply with the First Amendment. Profits and public relations, not 
constitutional principles, determine both how much and what kind of 
dissent can occur there.  
3. Managing Transborder Speech and Association  
Professor Magarian is rightly critical of the Roberts Court’s treatment of 
transborder speech and association rights in HLP. However, fear and 
rejection of “foreign” political expression is yet another basic hallmark of 
our managed speech tradition.79 That tradition includes a stunning lack of 
recognition of the many values relating to cross-border and beyond-border 
expression.  
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At and beyond U.S. borders, First Amendment rights have long been 
treated as quasi-constitutional rights.80 The judicial “quasi-recognition” of 
transborder First Amendment rights has entailed a reluctance to fully 
recognize and justify these rights; articulation of unique limitations on 
transborder rights; demotion or devaluation of certain transborder activities, 
such as the right to travel; substantial reliance on federal immigration and 
foreign affairs powers; and reflexive deference to national security 
concerns.81  
In this particular context, which has long gone nearly unnoticed by First 
Amendment scholars, courts have provided only the meekest coverage and 
protection for free speech and associational rights. As I explain elsewhere, 
the provincial or parochial perspective regarding transborder First 
Amendment rights extends at least as far back as the founders’ own fear of 
foreign influence.82 Thus, HLP is rooted in a longstanding parochial 
tradition that treats transborder speech and association as inherently 
dangerous and generally outside the domain of ordinary First Amendment 
rules and principles.  
In one important respect, in HLP, the Roberts Court expanded the 
government’s traditional degree of control with regard to cross-border 
speech and association. The Court retreated from Cold War precedents that 
had recognized the right to join associations that conducted peaceful 
political activities.83 Thus, the Roberts Court authorized the government to 
use the “material support” law to prosecute political collaboration even 
where the government had not proven any intent to further the violent and 
criminal activities of the organization. In this sense, HLP exacerbated the 
difficulties Americans face when they seek to communicate or associate 
with persons and institutions located beyond U.S. borders. 
Professor Magarian ably chronicles the Roberts Court’s embrace of 
“managed speech.” As he shows, the Court has not been a full-throated 
champion of outsiders, disruptive protesters, and other dissidents. Even 
decisions that have enforced the First Amendment rights of such 
individuals have done so only insofar as they act in ways that do not 
challenge or upset social order and stability. However, in most instances, 
particularly with regard to public dissent and protest, the Roberts Court was 
working within a longstanding managed speech framework. 
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II. MANAGED DISSENT BEYOND THE ROBERTS COURT 
Managed speech principles are deeply ingrained not just in First 
Amendment jurisprudence but in American free speech culture more 
generally. This Part examines some recent examples of efforts to control 
public dissent and protest in the managed speech tradition. Recent 
proposals for limiting or suppressing public protests and demonstrations, 
campus dissent, and professional athletes’ symbolic expressions of dissent, 
show the extent to which the managed speech approach has penetrated 
American free speech culture. In each of these examples, dissent and protest 
are being actively managed by public and private actors who wish to impose 
order and stability. Although constitutional doctrines and principles provide 
the framework under which protest and dissent are managed in these 
contexts, courts have played only a small role. The examples highlight both 
the extent to which our speech is managed speech and the challenges for 
Professor Magarian’s conception of “dynamic diversity.” 
A. Curbing Public Protests 
I have already mentioned the managerial controls that are authorized 
under the First Amendment’s public forum and time, place, and manner 
doctrines. In response to some recent public protests, state officials have 
proposed even tighter and more restrictive measures, all designed to tame 
and curb public protest. Many of these measures have not yet become law. 
However, the mere fact of their introduction is indicative of a shift toward 
imposing greater control over public dissent and protest. Whether they 
become law today, future public protests will likely provide an impetus for 
revisiting these and similar proposals.  
In general, the measures, which have been proposed in eighteen states 
thus far, would make public protest more difficult, more expensive, or even 
physically dangerous. They include the following: 
• Making it a felony to block a highway;  
• Significantly increasing the amount of civil fines for obstructing 
traffic or trespassing; 
• Authorizing police to shut down public protests, including by “any 
means necessary;” 
• Making it a crime to leave an “unlawful assembly;” 
• Allowing businesses to sue individuals who target them with 
protests; 
• Increasing fines for “mass picketing” behavior; 
• Prohibiting the wearing of masks, robes, or other disguises during 












• Permitting localities to charge protesters for the costs of policing 
events; 
• Exempting drivers from liability if they strike protesters under 
certain circumstances; 
• Pursuing protesters under anti-racketeering laws, including asset 
forfeiture provisions; 
• Making it a crime to threaten, intimidate, or retaliate against current 
or former state officials; and 
• Requiring public community colleges and universities to expel any 
student convicted of participating in a violent riot.84  
The national clamp down on protest and dissent has generated both 
domestic and international criticism. In the U.S., civil libertarians have 
objected that public officials are seeking to deter public dissent by 
criminalizing acts of public protest. In the international arena, the United 
Nations published a report suggesting that lawmakers in the U.S. were 
placing basic human rights relating to freedom of speech and assembly in 
jeopardy.85 
Some of the measures would likely violate the First Amendment, which 
may partly explain why they have not become law. Measures aimed directly 
at suppressing particular protests, that apply racketeering laws to even 
peaceful protests, that require protesters to cover the full cost of policing 
lawful demonstrations, and that release drivers from liability for running 
down protesters so long as they did so only negligently, have the purpose 
or likely effect of criminalizing or otherwise punishing lawful expressive 
activities. At least in most applications, such laws would likely violate the 
First Amendment.  
However, under the managerial framework discussed earlier, some of 
the proposals might well survive First Amendment scrutiny. Many 
measures already on the books, including permitting requirements and 
financial indemnification provisions, significantly burden public protests 
and demonstrations. Some of the proposed additional burdens, including 
increased fines and criminal penalties for seemingly minor offenses, would 
make it more difficult to mount effective public protests. This burden would 
be measured against the state’s interests in maintaining public order and 
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safety. When such balancing occurs, courts often defer to officials charged 
with keeping peace and order.  
My point is not to litigate the constitutionality of these proposals. 
Whether or not they would survive First Amendment scrutiny, the bills 
express an unambiguous desire to crack down on and curb public dissent. 
As noted earlier, many of the measures were introduced in direct response 
to particular protests, including minimum wage demonstrations, indigenous 
protests of the Standing Rock pipeline, Black Lives Matter protests in 
Ferguson, Missouri, and protests relating to Donald Trump’s election as the 
nation’s forty-fifth president.86 The Ferguson protests were marked by 
violence and looting, which of course can be proscribed. But it is telling 
that, in each instance, the reaction to protest events was to find ways to 
punish or deter even peaceful but sometimes disruptive forms of dissent and 
protest. 
Of course, in times of public turmoil, it is not unusual to see some degree 
of backlash against dissenters and protesters. Jehovah’s Witnesses, labor 
picketers, and others who challenged the status quo have faced measures 
designed to curb their public dissent and protect activities.87 During the civil 
rights era, various measures were adopted or enforced, particularly in 
southern states, to prohibit civil rights organizations from organizing, 
forming, protesting, and criticizing government.88 In general, public unrest 
and division tend to give rise to anti-protest measures. These recent 
examples show that the managerial impulse runs deep and is especially 
likely to be triggered during eras of sharp public contention.  
                                                 
86. See Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans Protesting the Dakota Access 
Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sep 9, 2016, 6:16 PM), https://perma.cc/RBU2-SESY (examining the events 
that led to the pipeline protests); Monica Davey & Julie Bosman, Protests Flare After Ferguson Police 
Officer Is Not Indicted, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/us/ferguson-
darren-wilson-shooting-michael-brown-grand-jury.html (explaining events that led to the Ferguson 
protests); Gregory Krieg, Police Injured, More Than 200 Arrested at Trump Inauguration Protests in 
DC, CNN (Jan. 21, 2017, 4:06 AM), https://perma.cc/5AZ4-445S (examining events surrounding arrests 
of protesters at Trump inauguration).  
87. For descriptions of early cases involving restrictions on the expressive rights of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, see Stephen M. Feldman, The Theory and Politics of First Amendment Protections: Why 
Does the Supreme Court Favor Free Expression Over Religious Freedom?, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 
443–51 (2006). Daniel Hildebrand, Free Speech and Constitutional Transformation, 10 CONST. 
COMMENT. 133, 150–59 (1993); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451–52 (1938) 
(invalidating ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature on public streets). For a discussion of early 
limits on labor picketing, see DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 1870–1920 
(1999).  
88. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 (1965) (invalidating the conviction of a leader of 
civil rights group seeking to protest racial segregation); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 
(1964) (invalidating state libel laws); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (invalidating 
breach of peace convictions against civil rights protesters); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963) 
(invalidating Virginia law that restricted solicitation of clients for purposes of challenging racial 
segregation in public schools); Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163 (1961) (invalidating breach of 












We appear to have entered another such era. To the extent cultural and 
political attitudes concerning dissent emanate from the top, President 
Trump’s actions and rhetoric have contributed to the backlash. As 
President, Trump has signed executive orders authorizing significant 
funding for militarizing local police forces.89 The Justice Department has 
aggressively investigated and prosecuted anti-Trump inaugural protesters 
under “conspiracy to riot” laws that carry substantial prison terms.90 
President Trump has also blocked dissenting voices from his Twitter 
account, precipitating a First Amendment lawsuit.91 Further, as discussed 
below, President Trump has weighed in multiple times against NFL players 
who silently protested during pre-game renditions of the national anthem.92 
The president has suggested that the players be fired or suspended for their 
acts of dissent.93 
Public rhetoric matches these actions. Candidate Trump invited 
attendees at his campaign rallies to literally “rough up” protesters.94 
Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, Trump fashioned himself the 
“law and order” candidate.95 The Trump Administration has refused to 
condemn violence against certain protesters.96 In the wake of Black Lives 
Matter protests across the nation, the Federal Bureau of Investigation has 
listed “black identity extremism” as a domestic terrorism threat.97 The 
Administration has steadfastly supported law enforcement officers in their 
policing of public protests—including, as noted, by providing federal funds 
for military equipment for use at public demonstrations.  
These bills, actions, and anti-dissent rhetoric are all part of the broader 
managed speech framework. The proposed laws are rooted in the 
jurisprudence of managed speech, which grants officials broad authority to 
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control public dissent and protest. The Administration’s acts and anti-
protest rhetoric are also redolent of the traditional preference for silent, non-
disruptive, and non-threatening forms of dissent. The unmistakable 
message is that even minor acts of civil disobedience will be met with 
severe punishment. These acts and attitudes chill dissent by suggesting the 
possibility of harsh penalties or even bodily injury for those who step out 
of line. They blur the space between peaceful protest and racketeering, and 
between lawful dissent and terrorism.  
Public opinion polling suggests that Americans, while supportive of free 
speech generally, are somewhat ambivalent about certain forms of dissent. 
For example, in a recent poll, a majority responded that a person who burns 
the U.S. flag should lose their citizenship and that controversial speakers 
should be banned from campus if students are likely to engage in violent 
protests in response to the speaker’s presence.98 Polling also suggests that 
Americans are ambivalent about protest movements. As one organization 
that tracks public opinion regarding protest movements has observed, “the 
public’s overall attitude regarding mass demonstrations seems to range 
from skepticism to outright condemnation.”99 This is true regardless of the 
movement’s agenda. Thus, civil rights, anti-war, and economic justice mass 
protests have all received similarly low levels of support from the American 
public. In sum, at least according to opinion polls, Americans prefer 
managed dissent to protest that upsets, stirs to anger, or unsettles.100  
These examples and findings show that the Supreme Court is not the 
only institution that has adopted and enforced a managed speech 
framework. Backed by the public order management system and a measure 
of public opinion, legislators have proposed increasingly speech- and 
assembly-suppressive laws. Executive officials have aggressively pursued 
anti-government protesters. The prevailing attitude concerning public 
contention and dissent seems to be this: public protest and dissent should 
be allowed, so long as it does not block intersections, keep individuals from 
attending scheduled events, take up too much space, get too close to 
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B. Managing Campus Dissent 
In the United States, there is a long tradition of dissent and protest on 
public university campuses.101 As has been true outside the campus gates, 
there have been efforts to crack down on dissident expression and protest—
in particular, during the civil rights and Vietnam eras.102 Contrary to 
suggestions that colleges were once open forums for expression, and have 
only recently become less supportive of free expression, campuses have 
actually experienced significant bouts of repression. As many have 
observed, public universities are facing new challenges in terms of student 
dissent and protest. The subject has received considerable attention in 
various media, and I will not attempt to examine campus free speech 
controversies in detail. I will focus instead on some of the most salient 
aspects of the management of campus dissent. 
1. The Campus Order Management System 
Public universities are unique places. Unlike other public properties, 
such as streets and parks, they exist primarily to ensure that students receive 
proper instruction and education in various disciplines. That said, as public 
institutions, universities are presumably subject to at least some of the 
constraints imposed by the First Amendment. Thus, students enjoy some 
free speech, association, press, and petition rights on campuses.103 Those 
rights may of course be tempered or even restricted by the institution’s 
interests in order, safety, and academic freedom. 
During the 1960s, university campuses experienced significant 
disruption as a result of civil rights protests.104 The Free Speech Movement 
at the University of California at Berkeley originated as a result of students’ 
clashes with administrators, who had prohibited public protests except in 
certain areas on campus.105 In particular, the students objected to the 
designation of small free speech areas that could be used for student 
protests. The Free Speech Movement ultimately prevailed against these 
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strict limitations on public expression. Across the nation, students thereafter 
participated in sit-ins, pickets, demonstrations, and strikes.  
Episodes such as the Free Speech Movement show that campuses are 
subject to the same kinds of convulsions and conditions that affect public 
dissent in other contexts. One disturbing recent trend, thoroughly 
documented by organizations like the American Civil Liberties Union and 
the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE), is an institutional 
crackdown on student dissent. What I have referred to as the “public order 
management system”—essentially, the bureaucracy that curbs and limits 
public protest and dissent in public places—has largely been imported onto 
university campuses.  
Under the “campus order management system,” many universities apply 
something like public forum and time, place, and manner principles to the 
open spaces of campus—quads, plazas, and other spaces that students could 
use for public protests.106 This managed speech regime includes the full 
panoply of managed speech mechanisms that are used in public places—
free speech zoning, permitting requirements, time limits, size limits, noise 
regulations, etc. University policies typically contain, at a minimum, a 
“Public Forum Policy,” an “Advertising, Distribution and Solicitation 
Policy,” and a “Policy on Speakers and Facilities Usage.”107 These policies 
are enforced to manage and control public contention on university 
campuses. Penalties for failure to comply with such policies range from the 
denial of a permit application to student expulsion. These and other 
regulations affect expressive activities ranging from pamphleteering to 
sizeable protests. 
Free speech zoning has been a prevalent managerial tactic on 
campuses.108 FIRE and the ACLU have been instrumental in challenging 
efforts to “zone” campus dissent. Yet, on many university campuses, free 
speech zoning persists. Campuses comprising tens of thousands of acres 
have sought to limit student speech to just a few small areas. For example, 
at one point Texas Tech University had designated a “free speech area” on 
its campus of 28,000 students and 2,000 acres that comprised 
approximately 400 square feet.109 This was the only space on campus where 
students were permitted to speak without advance permission. University 
administrators often defend these measures on the ground that they prevent 
“disruption.”  
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Campus officials have also sought to manage student dissent through 
“speech codes.”110 Although campus “speech codes” were invalidated by 
several federal courts in the 1990s, there is some evidence that officials 
retained or even continued to adopt them. One study from the early 2000s 
suggested that many universities retained portions of their speech codes 
even after similar provisions had been invalidated by federal courts.111 
More remarkably, some universities initially adopted their speech codes 
after these court decisions.112 Today, the regulation of offensive speech is 
accomplished through “codes of conduct,” sexual harassment policies, and 
other disciplinary rules. According to a 2006 FIRE study, ninety-three 
percent of universities surveyed still prohibited speech that is protected 
under the First Amendment.113  
Universities have also used a variety of other means, including 
standardless licensing schemes, fees, notice and registration requirements, 
and restrictions on “outsider” speech, to contain and manage dissent on 
campus.114 Some university regulations require advance presentation of any 
materials to be displayed. Protest organizations may also be required to 
meet with administrators prior to events, in order to discuss the nature of 
the proposed event and negotiate its logistical terms.115 Advance notice 
requirements can range from twenty-four hours to up to two weeks. Further, 
specific code provisions may grant officials the authority to deny permits 
for any expression that does not serve or benefit the entire university 
community.116 In all of these and in other respects, places of higher learning 
exhibit the same suppressive tendencies that influence regulation of 
expression in other public places.  
2. Managing Outside Voices 
With specific regard to the diversity of voices that can be heard on 
university campuses, universities vary widely in their approaches to outside 
speakers or what some call “non-university entities.”117 Many permit 
members of the public and other “non-university entities” to use at least 
some campus spaces. Others restrict outsiders’ access to those invited or 
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affiliated with student organizations. Still other universities impose broader 
restrictions, effectively denying outsider access.118 
American universities are once again roiling with free speech 
conflicts.119 Some of those conflicts relate to outside speakers. Many 
universities have rescinded invitations to outside speakers, some of whom 
had been invited to campus by students.120 Controversial speakers, 
including the avowed white supremacist Richard Spencer and provocateurs 
like Milo Yiannapolous, have planned events on campuses, some of which 
have been canceled.121  
Universities fear the potential disruption, including the threat of 
violence, controversial speakers may bring in their wake. They worry about 
their ability to provide adequate security and the considerable expense of 
doing so (which can run to millions of dollars in some cases). Not 
surprisingly, they have turned to managerial tools to try to resolve conflicts 
relating to outside speakers.  
Students concerned about the harms associated with offensive and 
denigrating speech have also taken certain steps to manage outside speakers 
on their campuses. Polling shows relatively strong support among the 
current generation of college students for silencing speech that offends 
minorities or makes students uncomfortable.122 One poll suggests that a 
majority of college students think it is acceptable to take action—including 
shouting down the speaker—in order to prevent someone from 
communicating opinions or ideas with which they disagree.123 These 
polling results are consistent with some recent incidents on college 
campuses. In some cases, students have physically blocked controversial 
speakers’ access to venues or attempted to assault them.124 Students have 
also interrupted or yelled over speakers in an effort to prevent them from 
                                                 
118. Id. 
119. See GREG LUKIANOFF, UNLEARNING LIBERTY: CAMPUS CENSORSHIP AND THE END OF THE 
AMERICAN DEBATE (2014); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 
(2017). 
120. See LUKIANOFF, supra note 13, at 29–36 (2014) (discussing “disinvitation season” on 
university campuses).  
121. Susan Svrluga, UC-Berkeley Says “Free Speech Week” is Canceled. Milo Yiannopolous Says 
He’s Coming Anyway,” WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/T69E-MJB5.  
122. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 119, at 12 (“We can confirm what the Pew 
Research Center reported in November 2015: this generation of college students is much more 
supportive of censoring offensive statements about minorities and much less supportive of protecting 
speech that makes some students uncomfortable.”). 
123. See Johnathan Villasenor, Views Among College Students Regarding the First Amendment: 
Results From A New Survey, BROOKINGS (Sep. 18, 2017), https://perma.cc/QZ33-SGR7. 
124. See, e.g., Peter Beinart, A Violent Attack on Free Speech at Middlebury, ATLANTIC (Mar. 6, 












communicating with audiences.125 Indeed, owing to the sheer number of 
such incidents on college campuses, one commentator dubbed the 2016–17 
academic year “the year of the shout-down.”126 
In response to shout-down and other disruptive actions by students, 
some universities have adopted policies that restrict the kinds of expressive 
disruption students may engage in at campus events.127 Thus, administrators 
have responded to student efforts to manage outside speech by adopting 
policies that manage student management of speech. These policies are the 
latest additions to the campus order management system discussed earlier. 
The outside speaker controversies are part of a broader debate on 
university campuses over freedom from speech.128 These controversies 
raise difficult First Amendment questions relating to university officials’ 
authority to exclude outside speakers. They also raise unresolved questions 
about whether there is a First Amendment right to heckle a speaker, which 
includes a right to drown out controversial speech altogether. First 
Amendment scholars have noted the surprising dearth of authorities relating 
to the rights of counter-protesters and hecklers.129  
Students using disruptive counter-protests to interfere with controversial 
speech may or may not be within their First Amendment rights when doing 
so. However, their speech serves the same purpose as other measures 
intended to exclude controversial speech and speakers from campus. What 
is more, the shout-down tactic evinces the same sort of lack of tolerance 
that many university policies communicate regarding student dissent. In 
other words, students exhibiting managerial intolerance may simply be 
imitating their local administrators, who have in many cases responded to 
controversial dissent with repression. 
Whatever the ultimate answers to these First Amendment questions may 
be, there is no question that administrators and students alike are invoking 
measures that are intended to manage and curb controversial speech on 
campuses. The campus order management system, which is rooted in public 
forum and time, place, and manner doctrines, serves as the backdrop for 
administrators’ responses. Students, as physical and expressive disruptors, 
sometimes also seek to manage access and communication by outsiders. 
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They attempt to control or silence voices they dislike or find offensive. 
Administrators, in response, are moving to limit or punish students’ 
disruptive actions.  
C. Managing Political Orthodoxy  
The lessons university students learn regarding free expression and the 
value of dissent will undoubtedly carry forward into their post-university 
lives.130 Insofar as students are learning that dissent need not be tolerated, 
or that the appropriate response to ideas one does not like is to drown them 
out or otherwise suppress them, American society will continue to confront 
issues relating to the proper response to public expressions of dissent and 
protest. 
One recent example is the conflict over whether NFL athletes must or 
ought to stand at respectful attention during the pre-game playing of the 
national anthem and flag ceremonies. Colin Kaepernick and other players 
took a knee or made other non-disruptive gestures of dissent during pre-
game ceremonies.131 As the athletes explained, they were not protesting the 
flag, the nation, or the U.S. military but rather what they considered 
examples of police brutality—specifically, what they believed to be 
unjustified shootings of African-Americans in several high-profile cases.132  
The NFL protests received increased national attention after President 
Trump weighed in via Twitter. President Trump has tweeted frequently 
about the issue, urging that any dissenting player—whom he described in 
one tweet as a “son of a bitch”—be suspended or fired for showing 
“disrespect” for the national anthem, the flag, and the nation’s military.133 
Depending on which opinion poll one consults and how it is constructed, a 
majority of the American public may actually support President Trump’s 
general position that kneeling is disrespectful and unpatriotic.134  
Note that in this particular instance, the rationale for objecting to dissent 
cannot be that the protests are disruptive—for example, in the way that 
mass social movement demonstrations can be. Taking a knee does not 
disrupt the playing of the anthem, the saluting of the flag, or the actual game 
itself. Rather, the principal objection seems to be the audience’s view that 
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even silent forms of public dissent and protest during the national anthem 
are inappropriate, disrespectful, or unpatriotic. 
The NFL is a private organization, and for that reason the controversy 
does not formally or technically involve the First Amendment. However, 
as some have observed, President Trump has crept closer and closer to the 
constitutional line in encouraging that kneeling players be benched or 
terminated.135 Whether or not the First Amendment formally applies, the 
official and public reactions to these acts of dissent implicate core free 
speech principles and values. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette,136 the Supreme Court invalidated state laws mandating that school 
children salute the United States flag. Barnette is part of the First 
Amendment canon. It is an iconic affirmation of a core right to dissent with 
respect to and resist majoritarian ideas regarding politics, patriotism, and 
nationalism. That affirmation is worth highlighting in the context of the 
NFL protests. 
In response to the state’s argument that its interest in national unity 
overrode the students’ right to object on religious and other grounds to the 
mandatory flag salute, Barnette said that “[s]truggles to coerce uniformity 
of sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and 
country have been waged by many good as well as by evil men.”137 As 
Justice Jackson wrote for the Court: “Those who begin coercive elimination 
of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory 
unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”138 In 
one of the best known passages in our First Amendment jurisprudence, 
Barnette concluded: “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”139 
Judging by the reaction to the NFL protests, the sitting president and 
many Americans do not share or indeed may have rejected Barnette’s anti-
orthodoxy principle. President Trump and others insist that individuals 
stand at attention while the national anthem is performed. Some adamantly 
insist that Americans think of the sacrifices of military personnel while the 
anthem plays. Some undoubtedly do so. But as Barnette concludes, a 
central point of that sacrifice was to preserve the right to decide for 
ourselves how we will react to our government and its symbols. As the 
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Court stated in Barnette, insisting (as President Trump and others have) on 
a particular response “invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is 
the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all 
official control.”140  
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR “DYNAMIC DIVERSITY” 
As the discussion thus far suggests, Americans have a complicated 
relationship with public dissent. We celebrate the virtues and victories of 
American dissenters, including our revolutionary ancestors. We are justly 
proud of our First Amendment right to dissent. We point to that right as 
evidence that we are a free people—freer, in fact, than citizens of other 
nations.  
However, if we Americans were to be honest with ourselves, we would 
acknowledge that our right to dissent is in some respects severely 
challenged. It is undermined by a managed speech regime that is deeply 
rooted in precedents, attitudes, laws, bureaucracies, and cultural norms 
concerning free expression. In just the three contexts I have examined, 
Americans have imposed increasingly restrictive controls on public 
contention, reserved the greatest protection for non-disruptive forms of 
expression, excluded controversial outside speakers, and supported a 
national political orthodoxy. In the opening lines of his book, Professor 
Magarian writes: “If a democracy doesn’t make noise, it dies.”141 In many 
respects, Americans are noisy and boisterous folk. But when it comes to 
public dissent, it seems many support making noise so long as it is not too 
loud, too raucous, or too disruptive.  
This Article highlights the challenges for Professor Magarian’s 
proposed alternative to managed speech, which he calls “dynamic 
diversity.”142 The approach calls for facilitating a diversity of ideas and a 
diversity of participation in public discussions.143 Dynamic diversity 
envisions a free speech jurisprudence that facilitates public debate in ways 
that “spur political change.”144 Professor Magarian argues that “we need 
First Amendment law to protect marginal, dissident, outsider voices.”145 He 
advocates a free speech framework that does not “merely bar government 
from restricting speech but requires, or at least presses, the government to 
promote speech.”146 Among other things, this approach would entail 
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facilitating greater access to government preserves such as public streets 
and parks.  
As is fitting for a book about the Roberts Court, Professor Magarian’s 
“dynamic diversity” model focuses primarily on what the Supreme Court 
might do to further the goals of dynamic diversity.147 Thus, Professor 
Magarian advocates a shift in the Court’s “center of gravity” from well-
heeled speakers “to dissenters and outsider speakers.”148 He wants the Court 
to “prioritize strong First Amendment protection for dissenters and outsider 
speakers,” including “[s]treet protesters” and “campus agitators.”149 As he 
observes, Court decisions following the dynamic diversity approach would 
not “treat[] speech that challenges the status quo as a threat to social order,” 
but rather as a powerful means of effecting social change.”150 Among other 
things, Professor Magarian urges the future Court to “restore expressive 
rights in public places” by “treat[ing] free expression not as an inconvenient 
encroachment on public spaces but as a primary purpose of those 
spaces.”151  
This will be an uphill climb. As I have noted, the Roberts Court did not 
pioneer the managed speech approach. Some of its decisions may have 
exacerbated its effects, but managed speech is part of a deep and stubbornly 
attached root system.152 Particularly as it relates to public protest and public 
contention, managed speech is now deeply entrenched in our First 
Amendment jurisprudence. However, even if future Courts fail to adopt the 
doctrines and principles of dynamic diversity, the approach merits 
consideration.  
Indeed, the most useful venues for contemplating and perhaps adopting 
the principles of dynamic diversity may be located outside and beyond the 
Supreme Court. Judicial decisions that facilitate a diversity of ideas and 
participants would likely effect some degree of change on the ground. But 
in our streets, on our campuses, and in the context of national social and 
political conflicts, it will take more than a handful of Supreme Court 
decisions to facilitate a path to something like dynamic diversity. It will 
take much larger-scale institutional and attitudinal transformations. 
The fundamental principles of dynamic diversity could help to bring the 
necessary changes about. As a society literally built on protest and dissent, 
we do need to focus attention on speakers who are outsiders, who challenge 
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the status quo, and who bring disruption to our streets, campuses, and 
athletic stadiums. We need not give them free reign; but we ought to 
provide the space necessary to bring a diversity of views and a diversity of 
participants to public places. 
Speech managers, including legislators who write laws designed to curb 
public protest, significantly constrain public discussion and diminish public 
participation. As Professor Magarian suggests, “only the organization and 
hierarchy necessary for a vigorous exchange of ideas should structure 
public debate.”153 Public forums are already difficult places to engage in 
effective protest and dissent. Imposing additional onerous requirements and 
enhancing the penalties for engaging in what are often minor acts of civil 
disobedience will further chill these activities.  
Legislators ought to resist the urge to impose draconian penalties for acts 
of civil and political disobedience. Disruption has limits, and officials can 
enforce existing public order and safety laws. But the bills and proposals 
discussed earlier seem designed not simply to maintain order, but to chill 
public dissent and expression. Applying racketeering laws and immunizing 
drivers who plow into protesters is not really about maintaining order. 
These measures penalize dissent and make protest more onerous or even 
physically perilous. They are part of a dangerous trend that threatens to chill 
a valuable means of effectuating social change. Civil rights and other 
activists need to pressure legislators to reject this approach as antithetical 
to the First Amendment and dangerous to constitutional liberty. 
Managing public protest and dissent on college campuses has not taken 
on the same draconian overtones. However, as discussed earlier, 
administrators have adopted many of the managerial techniques that are 
used outside the campus gates to control dissent within them. Speech-
friendly rules and procedures, which need not follow court decisions 
mandating adoption, could allow for robust exchanges in the open expanses 
of campus properties.  
Again, this does not mean that student speakers are entitled to protest 
whenever, wherever, and however they wish. Officials are obligated to 
maintain a level of order and decorum consistent with their educational 
goals. But insisting on detailed permits, excluding certain speech and 
speakers, and erecting tiny free speech zones for campuses that cover 
thousands of acres are not measures designed for that purpose. Rather, they 
are vestiges of a managed speech framework that impose order at the 
expense of diverse and robust public debate. 
                                                 












As Professor Magarian observes, “[m]anaged speech treats outsider 
speakers as useless at best and dangerous at worst.”154 Too often this has 
seemed to be the attitude of campus administrators and students alike. 
Dynamic diversity “rejects the managed speech tendency to scorn outside 
speakers.”155 Both administrators and students should recognize that 
speakers from outside the community can enhance the diversity of 
participants and ideas on campus. That does not mean anyone necessarily 
has a right to speak on campus, or that students must remain silent in the 
presence of speakers who do come to campus. But institutions of higher 
learning ought not to fear outsiders who come to “challenge existing 
institutions and power arrangements.”156  
Without embracing the substance of every speaker’s message, university 
communities could broadly welcome outside entities and participants. 
Students should of course have some latitude to dissent, perhaps including 
through disruptive expression. But they should not be permitted to silence 
outside speakers through violent acts or physical access barriers. At the 
same time, administrators ought to resist the urge to punish students who 
are not as welcoming as they ought to be by enacting punitive policies. 
Controversies regarding outside speakers can be effective “teaching 
moments.” Students, faculty, and administrators can all learn something 
about tolerance, freedom of expression, and equality from these 
controversies.  
Last, and perhaps most importantly, there must be a transformation in 
the way Americans process and interpret public dissent. During periods of 
contention, legislators reflexively seek to impose greater limits on public 
protests. This bespeaks a public attitude of intolerance toward civil 
disobedience and dissent. University administrators likewise turn to the 
campus order management system to control dissent on campus. According 
to some recent opinion polling, many university students share this same 
sort of intolerance for dissent.157 The polling suggests the rather urgent need 
for universities and others to expend resources and energy to educate 
students concerning the values of freedom of speech.  
As the conflict concerning NFL protests demonstrates, the cultural 
preference for polite and orthodox displays is deeply entrenched in 
American society. The urge to suppress public dissent emanates from all 
walks of life and all points on the political spectrum. In order to foster 
societal and political change, dissent must have adequate breathing space. 
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As Professor Magarian observes: “For dynamic diversity, disruption 
defines much of expressive freedom’s value.”158 Disruption need not be 
physical. It can operate at the level of mental processes and reactions. We 
need to ask why taking a knee during the national anthem so deeply 
affronts, and why this act of dissent cannot at least be tolerated even if 
people cannot fully support it. If there really is no room in our society for 
peaceful, symbolic gestures of this sort, then dynamic diversity is going to 
be a real moonshot.  
As trivial as it may seem, the NFL protest example encapsulates perhaps 
the biggest challenge for dynamic diversity. Scholars have shown that 
Supreme Court decisions generally tend to follow public opinion rather 
than shape it.159 If this is correct, and if the body politic is not open to a 
diversity of ideas and participants, there is little chance the Supreme Court 
will alter its course. Dynamic diversity must first take root with the 
participants and institutions whose actions are broadly framed by 
constitutional rules and values, but whose laws and policies give those 
things actual force. And it must follow significant changes in the way the 
American public views, reacts to, and tolerates public dissent.  
CONCLUSION 
As Professor Magarian’s study demonstrates, the dissenting speaker has 
not been the primary focus of First Amendment jurisprudence during the 
first decade or so of the Roberts Court. During prior eras, the Supreme 
Court did sometimes wax rhetorical on the importance of maintaining 
robust dissenters’ rights. It put Jehovah’s Witnesses, civil rights protesters, 
and others who challenged the status quo front and center. But in truth, even 
these revered dissenters were tolerated only insofar as they did not pose any 
threat of actual disruption or otherwise upset the social order in the course 
of expressing dissent. In general, the First Amendment protected the 
Witnesses’ and civil rights protesters’ non-truculent expression, so long as 
it was conveyed in a place the speakers had a right to be and without any 
aggressive intentions.  
Later, with the Court’s blessing, officials constructed a public order 
management system that neutralized and significantly stymied public 
dissent. Order became the order of the day. Disruption could not be 
tolerated. It had to be maintained, controlled, and managed. Today, this 
system is pervasive on our streets, on our campuses, and in our stadiums. 
We see it in the raft of legislative proposals for burdening and further 
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marginalizing public dissent. We see it in law enforcement tactics, which 
continue to use militarized methods to police and manage public dissent. 
We see it on our campuses, which have largely adopted a bureaucracy of 
management that applies to student speech from the quad to the classroom. 
Even some students have asserted a form of managerial authority, in 
blocking our ousting controversial speakers or speech. Finally, peaceful and 
non-disruptive athlete protests have been met with outrage, derision, and 
threats of adverse employment actions.  
Professor Magarian rightly decries the Roberts Court’s embrace, 
perpetuation, and in some cases exacerbation, of managed speech doctrines 
and principles. His “dynamic diversity” proposal encompasses the basic 
prerequisites for meaningful constitutional discourse and change. We do 
need more diverse messages and participants. Were a future Court to chart 
a course by the lights of “dynamic diversity,” we could experience some 
marginal change in the status and rights of dissenters. However, real change 
in this regard must come not from courts but from legislators, executive 
officials, campus administrators, students, and the public at large—all of 
whom will need to provide more breathing space for dissent in their 
respective communities.  
My prognosis has admittedly been mostly negative. But there may yet 
be hope for public dissent and dynamic diversity. Most of the bills to curb 
and punish public protesters have failed to garner majority support in state 
legislatures. Activists continue to risk arrest and detention to exercise rights 
to protest and dissent. Although a vocal and disruptive minority of college 
students have stolen the recent headlines, not all in that community agree 
that controversial speech is something to be avoided or exiled. Efforts to 
teach and educate students, without condescension or judgment, about the 
values of dissent and dynamic diversity must be part of a program to 
preserve and protect dissent. Americans like to disagree with one another. 
Now more than ever, they need to be reminded of the importance of 
preserving the right to express opinions at variance with those commonly 
or officially held.  
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